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Abstract
Social well-being is intrinsically multidimensional. Welfare indices attempting to reduce
this complexity to a unique measure abound in many areas of economics and public pol-
icy. Ranking alternatives based on such measures depends, sometimes critically, on how
the different dimensions of welfare are weighted. In this paper, a theoretical framework is
presented that yields a set of consensus rankings in the presence of such weight imprecision.
The main idea is to consider a vector of weights as an imaginary voter submitting prefer-
ences over alternatives in the form of an ordered list. With this voting construct in mind, a
rule for aggregating the preferences of many plausible choices of weights, suitably weighted
by the importance attached to them, is proposed. An axiomatic characterization of the rule
is provided, and its computational implementation is developed. An analytic solution is
derived for an interesting special case of the model corresponding to generalized weighted
means and the -contamination framework of Bayesian statistics. The model is applied to
the Academic Ranking of World Universities index of Shanghai University, a popular com-
posite index measuring academic excellence.
Keywords: multidimensional welfare, social choice, voting, Kemeny’s rule, graph theory,
-contamination
JEL classifications: D71, D72, I31, C61
∗I am grateful to Jim Lawrence for helpful and clarifying remarks and to Michaela Saisana for introducing
me to this interesting area of research. I also would like to thank Andrea Saltelli for his useful comments. The
views expressed herein are purely those of the author and may not in any circumstances be regarded as stating
an official position of the European Commission.
†European Commission Joint Research Center, Econometrics and Applied Statistics Unit, athanas-
soglou@gmail.com.
1
1 Introduction
Many aspects of social well-being are intrinsically multidimensional. Development, poverty,
inequality, education: these are all concepts that depend on a number of different criteria
and cannot be captured by simple quantitative measures ( [35, 36, 38, 3, 5, 10, 2], among
many others). Despite the inherent complexity of these settings, there is still a need to
compare and eventually order possible alternatives on the basis of the multidimensional
information they involve. Welfare indices attempt to accomplish this task by integrat-
ing the various dimensions of well-being into a single, one-dimensional measure. This is
generally achieved by assigning weights to the different dimensions and, in some fashion,
aggregating over them.
It should be intuitively clear that the chosen weights can have a major effect on
composite welfare scores and therefore on the final ranking of the various alternatives.
Their choice is laden with complex philosophical and operational dilemmas (see section
A.7 in Foster and Sen [17], Ravallion [31, 32], and Decanq and Lugo [12]), which means
that they need to be assigned in a systematic, transparent, and judicious fashion. From a
practical standpoint, many different methods for doing so have been proposed, including
principal component and factor analyses, data envelopment, public opinion polls, budget
allocation, analytic hierarchy processes, and expert consultation, among others. The
interested reader is referred to [12, 29] for a comprehensive survey.
Despite the wealth of available techniques to determine welfare index weights, their
determination remains controversial. Deep disagreements regarding the United Nations’
Human Development Index (HDI), a very popular measure of national wellbeing, are
emblematic of this point [31, 30]. Indeed, there is frequently no one “right” way to set
them and we are often justified, if not compelled to, consider the effect of many different
weights at once. Such an analysis would serve two goals: (a) to examine how robust a
given ranking of alternatives is to changes in weights, and (b) to determine a compromise
ranking that is in some sense “optimal” in the presence of weight imprecision.
Computational work in gauging the robustness of composite measures of welfare with
respect to the choice of weights primarily focused on Monte Carlo simulation (Saisana et
al. [33], OECD and JRC [29]). These approaches assessed the importance of weights in
the context of a broader uncertainty and sensitivity analysis of given indices. Of more rel-
evance to the present work, Duclos et al. [13] studied the robustness of multidimensional
poverty comparisons in a nonparametric setting. They established an analytic criterion
for determining whether a (pairwise) poverty comparison is robust to the choice of ag-
2
gregation procedure and poverty line within a wide class of poverty indices. Moreover,
they provided statistical tests that apply their insights to empirical settings. In follow-up
work, Duclos et al. [14] developed a similar framework for multidimensional inequality
comparisons. Pinar et al. [30] focused on the HDI index and used ideas from stochastic
dominance to determine the set of weights that results in best-case performance for a
particular country. They used these weights to test the robustness of the HDI index
over time. Anderson et al. [4] adopted a nonparametric approach, by imposing mono-
tonicity and quasiconcavity on the welfare function and deriving upper and lower bounds
on welfare levels for the various alternatives/agents. They, too, applied their framework
to the HDI. Alternatively, Foster et al. [16] studied linear composite indices of welfare
and adopted a parametric structure for weight imprecision based on the -contamination
model of Bayesian analysis (Berger and Berliner [8]). In their setting, a pairwise com-
parison between alternatives was defined to be robust with respect to a given level of
weight imprecision if all of the weight vectors corresponding to it (i.e., this level of weight
imprecision) produce composite scores that maintain the same relative ranking. In their
analysis, the key quantity of interest became the maximum level of imprecision at which
the pairwise comparison remains robust.
Contribution. I take a fundamentally different approach. An important feature of the
analytical framework I propose is that, unlike that of previous contributions [13, 14, 4,
16, 30], it can efficiently produce complete rankings in high-dimensional settings of mul-
tiple alternatives and indicators (e.g., see Section 6). In my model, which I describe in
Section 2, welfare is modeled via a general function u, whose arguments are normalized
achievement vectors (corresponding to performance across the different dimensions of
welfare) and weight vectors, reflecting the weight attached to each dimension of welfare.
Each vector of weights is itself weighted via a nontrivial and Lebesgue integrable impor-
tance function f . This function captures beliefs and/or tastes regarding the correct set
of weights to use.1 Subsequently, in Section 3, I use the theory of social choice to propose
a consensus ranking of the alternatives given this weight imprecision. Viewing a vector
of weights as an abstract voter who expresses his/her preferences over alternatives via
the welfare function u, an electorate is constructed by considering each weight vector w
1That both u and f are model primitives is reminiscent of certain settings of decision-making under ambiguity,
where the existence of a utility function and a second-order probability distribution over a set of Bayesian priors
are assumed (Klibanoff et al. [21]). Still, it should be mentioned that these assumptions are not crucial and that
the model is general enough to accommodate fully nonparametric analytical frameworks (see Section 2).
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in the simplex and introducing f(w) (possibly irrational) copies of itself having identi-
cal preferences. This operation results in a continuum of voters E(f) of finite Lebesgue
measure. Next, I propose Kemeny’s rule (Kemeny [20]) as a way of resolving voter dis-
agreement and computing a consensus ranking, given the preferences of this electorate of
weight vectors E(f). Well-established in the social choice and voting literatures [25, 42],
Kemeny’s rule produces a ranking (referred to as “Kemeny-optimal”) that minimizes the
sum of pairwise rank disagreements with respect to stated voter preferences. Drawing
from the results of Young [40] and Young and Levenglick [43], an axiomatic characteri-
zation of the rule is provided, on the basis of five intuitive properties. Yet, it should be
noted that the appeal of the proposed rule may extend beyond axiomatic considerations
since, under certain statistical frameworks, Kemeny’s rule can be interpreted as providing
the maximum likelihood estimate of the objectively “correct” ranking [41, 11].
In Section 4, I explore the computational implementation of Kemeny’s rule to the
present context. This is because, despite its many virtues, Kemeny’s rule suffers from
one very serious drawback: the computation of a Kemeny-optimal ranking is NP-hard [7],
even when the number of criteria is just four [15]. The main problem arises from the
potential presence of so-called Condorcet cycles, implying intransitive majority (pairwise)
preferences. Yet, viewing the problem under a graph theoretic lens, it may be possible
to reduce it to a series of smaller and more tractable problems. The main insight is to
use a seminal algorithm of Tarjan [37] to identify the strongly connected components of a
suitably-defined directed graph, which in turn contain maximal-size Condorcet cycles of
the underlying social choice problem. If the length of these cycles is small enough, brute-
force enumeration can resolve them efficiently. If not, it is necessary to use approximation
algorithms and I implement the ones that provide the best approximation guarantees
available, due to Van Zuylen and Williamson [44].
In Section 5, I analytically work out an interesting special case of the model cor-
responding to generalized weighted means, a family of welfare functions that are very
popular in practice [29, 16, 39], and the -contamination setting of Foster et al. [16].
Using results from polyhedral geometry (Lawrence [24]) it is possible to present a closed-
form formula for the proportion of weights ranking one alternative over another. This
formula facilitates computations significantly, as Kemeny’s rule can be applied without
the need to compute these proportions numerically. Moreover, it is possible to prove that
these proportions are monotonic in , the magnitude of weight imprecision.
In Section 6, I apply the special case of the model presented in Section 5 to Shanghai
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Jiao Tong University’s Academic Ranking of World Universities (ARWU).2 The ARWU
index is a widely-used composite index measuring academic excellence. It linearly ag-
gregates (normalized) academic performance across 6 dimensions to produce university
rankings. These rankings receive a lot of media attention; in some cases they may even
drive political discourse on national university systems [34]. Nonetheless, it has been
shown that they can be very sensitive to seemingly ad-hoc conventions, including the
choice of weights [34]. The controversial nature of this index, in combination with its rel-
atively high dimensionality (100 countries, 6 indicators), render it a good application area
for the model. The analysis does indeed show how introducing even moderate amounts
of weight imprecision may have a very significant effect on a university’s ARWU rank.
Connections to Knightian uncertainty. On a final note, it is worth mentioning the
possible connections of this work to the decision-theoretic literature on Knightian uncer-
tainty. The examination of welfare indices under weight imprecision is, mathematically if
not conceptually, analogous to certain settings of decision-making under ambiguity (see
Gilboa and Marinacci [18]). Uncertain weight vectors over dimensions of well-being can
be recast as uncertain Bayesian priors over (a finite collection of) states of nature. Cor-
respondingly, the analogy of Bayesian priors as voters, expressing their preferences over
a finite set of actions can once again be evoked and ideas from voting theory can be used
in this context, too. As a result, the work presented here may be of relevance to this
vibrant field of economic theory.
Paper outline. The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the formal
model. Section 3 applies Kemeny’s rule to our context and discusses the normative
implications of this choice. Section 4 focuses on computational issues and shows how the
determination of Kemeny-optimal rankings can be efficiently tackled. Section 5 derives an
analytic solution for a compelling special case of the model corresponding to generalized
weighted means and -contamination. Section 6 implements the proposed procedure to
the 2013 ARWU Index, while Section 7 provides conclusions and directions for future
research. All mathematical proofs and figures are collected in the Appendix.
2www.shanghairanking.com
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2 Model Description
Consider a set of alternatives A indexed by a = 1, 2, ..., A and a set of indicators I indexed
by i = 1, 2, ..., I. Let xai ∈ [0, 1] denote alternative a’s normalized value of indicator i,
and xa ∈ [0, 1]I its achievement vector collecting all such information3 (all vectors are
taken to be column vectors). XA ⊂ [0, 1]I×A denotes an achievement matrix collecting
the achievement vectors of alternatives in A. That is, the (i, j)’th entry of XA is xaji.
Assume that performance across indicators is weighted by a vector w belonging in
∆I−1 = {w ∈ <I : w ≥ 0, ∑Ii=1wi = 1}, the (I − 1)-dimensional simplex. Here,
wi represents the weight given to indicator i. The welfare corresponding to achievement
vector x and w is given by a general function
u(x,w) : <I ×∆I−1 7→ <. (1)
The welfare function is purposefully left general in order to accommodate many different
multidimensional phenomena from poverty [13, 2], to inequality [17, 38], to develop-
ment [3].
Now, define an importance function f on the simplex ∆I−1, satisfying f(w) ≥ 0 for
all w ∈ ∆I−1 and 0 < ∫
∆I−1 f(w)dw < +∞. For instance, if f(w) = 1 if and only if
w ∈ W for some W ⊂ ∆I−1 having non-negligible Lebesgue measure in <I−1 and is zero
everywhere else, then this implies that all w ∈ W are assigned equal importance, while
all w 6∈ W are not considered at all. Similarly to u, the importance function f is a model
input and its determination will be case-specific.4
Given a welfare function u and achievement matrix XA, define for all (ai, aj) ∈ A×A
the following subset of ∆I−1:
WXA,uaiaj =
{
w ∈ ∆I−1 : u(xai ,w) ≥ u(xaj ,w)
}
. (2)
Now define a profile L to be a triplet L = (XA, f, u), and let L denote the space of all
profiles. Given a profile L, define the election matrix Y L:
Y Lij =
∫
W
XA,u
aiaj
f(w)dw −
∫
W
XA,u
ajai
f(w)dw, ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2, ..., A}. (3)
3For simplicity, I choose the normalized values to lie in [0,1], though any other interval [xmin, xmax] would also
work.
4For example, in the case of the HDI, u is a weighted geometric mean, while f could be set in the following
manner: ask each country c to provide its importance function fc on ∆
2 and then set f =
∑C
c=1 fc (where C is
the total number of countries).
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The entry Y Lij measures the net majority of weights resulting in higher welfare for alter-
native ai than aj, as measured by welfare function u applied to achievement vectors xai
and xaj , appropriately weighted by the importance function f .
Similarly, we define the proportion matrix V L, where
V Lij =
∫
W
XA,u
aiaj
f(w)dw∫
∆I−1 f(w)dw
, ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2, ..., A}, . (4)
representing the proportion of weights in ∆I−1 resulting in weakly higher welfare for
alternative ai than aj, as measured by welfare function u applied to achievement vectors
xai and xaj , appropriately weighted by the importance function f .
In general, the integrals in Eqs. (3)-(4) will need to be tackled numerically. Never-
theless, we will see that analytic solutions are also possible for some compelling special
cases of u and f (see Section 5).
Discrete importance functions. Before proceeding, I wish to note that the model can
be straightforwardly extended to account for discrete importance functions f on a finite
(or countable) subset of weights belonging in ∆I−1. In this case, the integrals in Eqs. (3)-
(4) would become summations over the relevant subset of ∆I−1 and all of the results in
Sections 3 and 4 would naturally extend.
Embedding a completely nonparametric framework. On a final note, the model I
have introduced can accommodate a completely nonparametric framework of analysis, in
which there is no need to choose a functional form for the welfare function u. I briefly
explain how. Consider the following discrete model instance with:
u(x,w) =
I∑
i=1
wixi,
and (here, ei denotes the I-dimensional i’th standard basis vector)
f(w) =
 fi ≥ 0 if w = ei ∈ {e1, e2, ..., eI},0, otherwise, (5)
where
∑I
i=1 fi > 0. In this setting, the importance function f can be re-interpreted as
the importance placed on each indicator i, as opposed to each vector of weights w. Cor-
respondingly, profiles featuring such u-f combinations lead to election matrices whose
entries reflect the net majority of indicators favoring one alternative over another, appro-
priately weighted by their (i.e., the indicators’) assumed importance.
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3 Weight imprecision and social choice theory
3.1 Weight Vectors as Abstract Voters
Given a profile L = (XA, f, u), suppose we think of a vector of weights w ∈ ∆I−1 as an
imaginary voter who expresses their preferences over the alternatives in A via the appli-
cation of welfare function u on the achievement vectors in XA. That is, voter w (weakly)
prefers an alternative ai over aj if and only if u(xai ,w) > u(xaj ,w) (u(xai ,w) ≥
u(xaj ,w)). Thus, voter w’s preferences will be expressed as a possibly partial order-
ing of the alternatives.
Subsequently, construct an abstract electorate of voters by considering eachw ∈ ∆I−1
and introducing f(w) (possibly irrational) copies of itself. Thus, the greater f(w) is, the
more voters holdingw’s preferences are introduced. This operation results in a continuum
of voters E(f) of finite measure, since
0 <
∫
E(f)
dv =
∫
∆I−1
f(w)dw < +∞.
With the electorate E(f) in mind, the quantity Y Laiaj of Eq. (4) defines the net majority
of voters within E(f) preferring alternative ai to aj, under welfare function u applied to
xai and xaj . Thus, all information on the pairwise preferences of the electorate E(f)
over the set of alternatives A is succinctly summarized by the matrix Y L.
Given that it is unlikely that all weight vectors will yield the same ordered lists of
alternatives, there will not be a ranking of A that is consistent with the preferences of all
weights belonging to ∆I−1. Thus, the question arises: In view of this inconclusiveness,
what would constitute a “good” way of aggregating the preferences of all weight vectors,
suitably weighted by the importance a decision maker places on them?
3.2 Kemeny’s Rule
Variations of the above question have concerned philosophers and social scientists since
the work of Condorcet and Borda in the 18th century. To state the problem formally,
assume a finite set of voters N = {1, 2, ..., N} and alternatives A = {a1, a2, ..., aA}. A
ranking R is a bijective map from A to {1, 2, ..., A}, where R(a) is interpreted as the rank
of alternative a. Let RA denote the set of all rankings of A. A (voting) rule maps a set of
N input rankings, representing voters’ ordinal preferences, to a set of nonempty subsets
of RA, representing the socially optimal consensus ranking(s). The objective becomes
that of selecting a voting rule that is, in some sense, “optimal”.
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In an important paper, Kemeny [20] introduced a rule which I will refer to as Ke-
meny’s rule.5 Given a set of individual rankings, Kemeny’s rule produces a ranking
(referred to as “Kemeny-optimal”) that minimizes the sum of pairwise disagreements
with respect to voter preferences. More formally, the Kendall-τ distance between two
rankings R1 and R2, denoted by τ(R1, R2), is defined as the number of pairs (ai, aj)
such that R1(ai) > R1(aj) and R2(ai) < R2(aj). Hence, τ(R1, R2) counts the number
of (pairwise) relative rank disagreements between R1 and R2. Given a set of rankings S
(corresponding to the ranked preferences of the set of voters), a Kemeny-optimal ranking
is a ranking K that minimizes the function
∑
S∈S τ(·, S) over the set of rankings RA, i.e.,
K = arg min
R∈RA
∑
S∈S
τ(R, S). In the realm of social choice, Kemeny’s rule is widely recognized
as a very appealing method for aggregating individual preferences [25, 42].
Beyond its intuitiveness, Kemeny’s rule rests on strong axiomatic foundations, which
I briefly discuss. A voting rule is anonymous if it treats all voters alike, while it is neutral
if it treats all alternatives alike. That is, the identity of a voter or alternative do not play
a role in the consensus ranking. A rule satisfies reinforcement if, whenever two distinct
groups of voters separately reach a common set of consensus rankings, then this set is also
agreed upon when the two groups are merged. A rule satisfies the Condorcet criterion if,
whenever there is an alternative that, when compared with every other, is preferred by a
majority of voters, then this alternative is ranked first. A rule is Condorcet if it satisfies
a variation of the Condorcet criterion, suitably interpreted for preference functions (see
Young and Levenglick [43]). A voting rule is unanimous if, whenever all voters rank one
alternative over another, then so does the consensus ranking. Finally, define an interval
of a ranking to be a subset of alternatives that are ranked in succession, i.e., that appear
“together” in the ranking without gaps. A rule satisfies local independence of irrelevant
alternatives (LIIA) if the ranking of alternatives within each interval remains fixed if
we ignore alternatives outside of it (see Young [41, 42]). For instance, this means that
the ranking of the alternatives at the top of the consensus ranking is unaffected if we
remove those in the bottom and re-apply the rule to the restricted problem. As a result,
LIIA implies that the voting rule cannot be manipulated by adding unrealistically bad or
good alternatives to the mix. In an important paper, Young and Levenglick [43] proved
that Kemeny’s rule is the only voting rule that is Condorcet and satisfies neutrality and
5In the literature it is also sometimes referred to as the “maximum likelihood” or the “Condorcet” rule. As
Young noted in [41], the Marquis de Condorcet was the first to propose this way of deciding an election, even if
he did not work out the formal details.
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reinforcement. What is more, this characterization can be used to establish that Kemeny’s
rule is the unique voting rule satisfying anonymity, neutrality, unanimity, reinforcement,
and LIIA (see Young [41, 42]).
Yet, the appeal of the Kemeny rule extends beyond purely normative considera-
tions. This is because Young [41] showed that, under a particular kind of statistical
framework, Kemeny’s rule can be characterized using maximum likelihood estimation.
That is, assuming the existence of an objectively “correct” ranking of which voter prefer-
ences provide a particular kind of noisy signal, Kemeny’s rule provides the ranking which
maximizes the associated likelihood function.6 This finding has proven to be robust to
generalizations of Young’s basic model (Conitzer [11]), suggesting the existence of an
epistemic basis behind the adoption of Kemeny’s rule.
Application to multidimensional welfare indices. I now proceed to apply the concep-
tual apparatus of Kemeny’s rule to rankings based on multidimensional welfare indices.
Fix the set of alternatives A and set of indicators I. Given a profile L = (XA, f, u)
and a weight vector w ∈ ∆I−1, let RXA,uw denote the partial ranking of alternatives
in A that this vector of weights implies, via the application of the welfare function u
to w and the achievement matrix XA. That is, for all pairs of alternatives (ai, aj),
RXA,uw (ai) ≤ RXA,uw (aj)⇔ u(xai ,w) ≥ u(xaj ,w). Note that this allows for ties between
alternatives, hence the fact that RXA,uw is a partial ranking.
In the usual formulation of Kemeny’s rule, the set of voters is finite so the sum∑
S∈S τ(·, S) is well-defined. In our context, recall how we constructed the electorate
E(f): each w in ∆I−1 corresponds to f(w) voters, each having the partial input ranking
RXA,uw . Thus, given a profile L = (XA, f, u), the Kemeny-optimal set of rankings K
L is
given by:
KL = arg min
R∈RA
{∫
∆I−1
τ
(
R,RXA,uw
)
f(w)dw
}
. (6)
Note that while input rankings RXA,uw are allowed to be partial, K
L still has to be a set of
full rankings. This generalization of Kemeny’s rule to allow for partial input rankings is
consistent with other contributions, such as Ailon [1] and Van Zuylen and Williamson [44].
To apply formula (6) to our context, it is necessary to identify the partial rankings
RXA,uw for at least all w ∈ ∆I−1 satisfying f(w) 6= 0. However, this challenging task can
be sidestepped, since to calculate a Kemeny-optimal ranking we only need the results
6Interestingly, under the same statistical framework, when the objective is to determine just the first-place
alternative and not the entire ranking, it is Borda’s rule [40] that provides the maximum likelihood estimate
(Young [41]).
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of all pairwise comparisons between elements in A, given by matrix Y L. Thus, letting
(ai, aj) ∈ A×A denote ordered pairs of alternatives in A and 1{·} the indicator function,
we may write, for all L = (XA, f, u),
K(L) ≡ KL = arg min
R∈RA
∑
(ai,aj)∈A×A
1{R(ai) < R(aj)}Y Lji . (7)
Assuming that a set of M ≥ 1 rankings {RL1 , RL2 , ..., RLM} attains the minimum in Eq (7),
KL will be expressed as an A×M matrix, where entry KLim equals RLm(ai).
As a final note, I briefly comment on the applicability of partial input rankings within
the context of the model. Consider the restricted domain of profiles L˜ where
L˜ = {L ∈ L : V Lij + V Lji = 1, ∀(ai, aj) ∈ A×A s.t. i 6= j} . (8)
The domain restriction L˜ is equivalent to imposing that the set of weights resulting in
equal welfare for any pair of alternatives will, upon being appropriately weighted by
the importance function, have negligible Lebesgue measure in <I−1. As a result, weight
vectors resulting in ties between alternatives can be ignored, as those vectors are, in a
relative sense, too “few” to have an effect on the selection of the consensus rankings.
Indeed, V Lij can be interpreted as the proportion of weights strictly favoring ai over aj
given profile L.
The above restriction will be applicable for widely-used profile classes (see [12] and
Section 5.1), as the following Proposition suggests.
Proposition 1 Consider the class of welfare functions U∗, where u ∈ U∗ if and only
if it can be expressed as either (a) u(x,w) = g
(∑I
i=1wiui(xi)
)
, or (b) u(x,w) =
g
(∏I
i=1 ui(xi)
wi
)
, where ui are positive functions that are strictly monotone on [0, 1], and
g is an invertible real-valued function. Then, for any profile L satisfying L = (XA, f, u)
with u ∈ U∗ and xai 6= xaj for all i 6= j, we have L ∈ L˜.
Proof. See Appendix.
3.3 An Axiomatic Characterization
In this section, we explore the normative implications of adopting rule K. This requires
adapting to our setting the properties discussed in Section 3.2.
Define a rule φ to be a function from L to the set of nonempty subsets of RA. For a
profile L = (XA, f, u) and a ranking R, let
nLR =
∫
∆I−1
1
{
RXA,uw = R
}
f(w)dw (9)
11
denote the f -weighted Lebesgue measure of the set of weights in ∆I−1 having ranking R,
given welfare function u and achievement matrix XA.
Definition 1 A rule φ satisfies anonymity if for all profiles L, φ depends only on the
numbers nLR for each R ∈ RA.
Anonymity ensures that no weight vector is given special treatment in the under-
lying social choice problem. Instead, the ordinal preferences of all weights w receive
consideration according to their importance f(w). As a result, cardinal information on
the intensity, or magnitude, of an alternative’s dominance over another is not allowed
to directly affect the consensus ranking. To illustrate this point more fully, consider the
following example. Suppose we have two sets of weights W1 and W2 and a set of two
alternatives A = {a1, a2} such that:∫
W1
f(w)dw =
∫
W2
f(w)dw,
u(xa1 ,w
1) = 1000 > u(xa2 ,w
1) = 1, ∀w1 ∈ W1,
u(xa1 ,w
2) = 2 > u(xa2 ,w
2) = 1, ∀w2 ∈ W2.
What anonymity implies is that the sets of weights W1 and W2 will play the exact same
role in the determination of the consensus rankings. Furthermore, it ensures that, all
else being equal, we could change u(xa1 ,w
1) from 1000 to 1.1 for all w1 ∈ W1, and the
consensus rankings would remain unaffected.
Definition 2 A rule φ is neutral if for all profiles L = (XA, f, u) and permutations σ
of alternatives in A, φ(Xσ◦A, f, u) = σ ◦ φ(XA, f, u).
Neutrality imposes that the identity of alternatives not matter to the rank they
receive. Instead, the rule is symmetric in its treatment of alternatives: if their identities
were permuted, then the consensus rankings would be similarly permuted.
Definition 3 A rule φ satisfies reinforcement if, for all profiles L1 = (XA, f1, u) and
L2 = (XA, f2, u) such that f1 and f2 have non-overlapping supports in ∆I−1,
φ(L1) ∩ φ(L2) 6= ∅ ⇒ φ(XA, f1 + f2, u) = φ(L1) ∩ φ(L2).
Reinforcement sets the following requirement: if, ceteris paribus, two importance
functions having non-overlapping support separately lead to two sets of consensus rank-
ings whose intersection is nonempty, then applying the rule to the profile having the sum
of the importance functions should acknowledge and reinforce this agreement.
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Reinforcement imposes a degree of consistency to the way a rule aggregates individual
preferences. Take for instance the case of the HDI whose indicator set involves three
criteria: (1) health (2) education, and (3) income. Suppose two groups of countries, say
Africa and Europe, have completely differing opinions regarding the correct weighting
scheme of the three dimensions of the HDI. In particular, African countries claim that
the only viable weight vectors are those that assign the greatest weight to health, the
second greatest to income, and the third greatest to education, while no indicator can
receive a weight that exceeds 0.5. All weight vectors satisfying the above restriction
are equally valid, while all others should not be considered at all. European countries
have similarly structured preferences, except that they claim that highest weight must
always be given to education, second-highest to health, and third-highest to income. The
above value judgments can be encoded in importance functions that are equal to 1 in the
relevant subsets of ∆2 and zero everywhere else. Suppose now that the United Nations
chooses a method of ranking countries that, when considering the opinions of Africa and
Europe separately leads to the same consensus ranking. In that case, it is eminently
desirable to additionally require that the UN’s method, when considering the preferences
of Africa and Europe jointly, not disturb their pre-existing consensus.
Definition 4 A rule φ is extended-Condorcet if, for all profiles L, if there exists
a partition (A1,A2) of A such that for all (ai, aj) ∈ A1 × A2 we have Y Lij > 0, then
R(ai) < R(aj) for all (ai, aj) ∈ A1 ×A2, for all R ∈ φ(L).
Thus, a rule is extended-Condorcet if it obeys the majority wishes of the electorate
E(f), whenever these do not imply circular ambiguities majority pairwise preferences.
This property generalizes the concept of the Condorcet criterion to settings in which the
objective is to choose an entire consensus ranking, not just the winning alternative.7
Definition 5 A rule φ is unanimous if, for all profiles L, if there exists a ranking R
such that for all pairs (ai, aj) ∈ A × A, R(ai) < R(aj) ⇒ {V Lij = 1 and V Lji = 0}, then
φ(L) = R.
Unanimity requires that, if all but a negligible set of weights submit the same ranking
of the alternatives, then the rule should respect this complete consensus. It is a standard
property in many problems in social choice.
7It should be noted that this property is not the same as the Condorcet property of Young and Levenglick’s [43]
characterization. The latter is a little more intricate.
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Definition 6 A rule φ satisfies local independence of irrelevant alternatives (LIIA)
if, for all profiles (XA, f, u), for all R ∈ φ(XA, f, u), for every interval B of R, RB ∈
φ(XAB , f, u) where XAB represents XA restricted to alternatives in B, and RB repre-
sents R’s relative ordering of alternatives in B; moreover, all rankings in φ(XAB , f, u)
can be generated in this way.
LIIA is a little more subtle than the previous properties. But, some reflection also
suggests that it is a desirable stabilizing property for a rule to satisfy. It implies that the
ordering of alternatives that are ranked “together” (i.e., consecutively) in a consensus
ranking should not change if we apply the rule to the restricted problem that focuses
just on these alternatives and ignores all others. Usually such intervals correspond to
meaningful categories of alternatives. To take an example from the empirical application I
will pursue in Section 6, suppose that a composite index is measuring academic excellence
and has ranked the 100 best universities in the world. We would prefer the relative
ordering of the top 20 (representing, say, Tier 1 institutions or something to that effect),
to remain unchanged if we, for instance, re-apply the rule by ignoring those universities
ranked 91-100, 51-100, or even the entire 21-100 for that matter. The same argument
would apply for the relative ordering of Tier 2 institutions, or indeed any other meaningful
interval within the consensus ranking. For more information on LIIA the interested reader
can refer to Young [42].
Part (ii) of the following theorem is a consequence of the results of Young and Lev-
englick [43] and Young [40, 41] adapted to our setting.
Theorem 1 Consider the rule K of Eq. (7).
(i) On the domain L, K satisfies anonymity, neutrality, reinforcement, extended-Condorcet,
unanimity, and LIIA.
(ii) Let YQ denote the set of rational skew-symmetric matrices whose rows and columns
are indexed by the elements of A. On the restricted domain LQ = {L ∈ L : Y L ∈ YQ},
K uniquely satisfies anonymity, neutrality, reinforcement, unanimity, and LIIA.
Proof. See Appendix.
Theorem 1 makes clear a set of five reasonable properties that characterize the rule K.
In addition, K satisfies the extended-Condorcet criterion. Ultimately, if one finds these
properties compelling, then they may also look favorably upon K as a way of dealing
with weight imprecision in multidimensional welfare indices. In any case, the normative
basis of K is made evident.
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4 Computational issues
Eq. (7) summarizes the Kemeny-optimal ranking we wish to find. We would at this point
be done, if not for the fact that the associated optimization problem is NP-hard [7], even
when the number of indicators is just four [15].
The main difficulty arises from the potential presence of Condorcet cycles, which im-
ply intransitive majority pairwise preferences. Formally, a set of alternatives {ai1 , ai2 , ..., aiM}
forms a Condorcet cycle if min{Y L12, Y L23, ..., Y LM−1M , Y LM1} ≥ 0. If no such cycles existed,
finding a unique Kemeny-optimal ranking would be a straightforward affair (see The-
orem 2 below). Thus, it is important to identify and, in some fashion, resolve these
cycles.
Graph-theoretic preliminaries. In this section, I briefly introduce some relevant graph-
theoretic concepts that will be useful later. A directed graph G is a pair G = (V , E), where
V is a set of vertices and E a set of ordered pairs of vertices, referred to as edges.
Given two subsets V1, V2 of V such that V1 ∩ V2 = ∅, let
in(V1,V2) = |{e ∈ E : e = (u, v), u ∈ V2, v ∈ V1}| . (10)
Thus Eq. (10) denotes the number of edges leading to vertices in V1, originating from
vertices in V2.
A subgraph G′ = (V ′, E ′) of a directed graph G = (V , E) is a graph such that V ′ ⊂ V
and E ′ = {(v, u) ∈ E : v, u ∈ V ′}. A directed graph is called strongly connected if there is
a path from each vertex to every other vertex (in both directions). The strongly connected
components of a directed graph G are its maximal-size strongly connected subgraphs.
L-Dominance graphs and Kemeny rankings. Given a profile L, define the directed
graph GL =
(A, EL), whose vertices correspond to alternatives in A and whose edges
satisfy EL =
{
(ai, aj) ∈ A×A : Y Laiaj ≥ 0, i 6= j
}
. Thus, a pair (ai, aj) belongs to G
L’s
edge set if and only if a weak net majority of the voters in the electorate E(f) assign to ai a
higher welfare than aj, as measured by u applied to xai and xaj – with no self-edges (ai, ai)
allowed. We refer to GL as an L-dominance graph, as it captures the above dominance
relationship between all pairs of alternatives. Clearly, a cycle in GL corresponds to a
Condorcet cycle in the underlying social choice problem. Moreover, alternatives forming
such a cycle must, by definition, belong to the same strongly connected component of
GL. As a result, if no Condorcet cycles existed, then all strongly connected components
of GL would be singletons.
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The following Theorem exploits the special structure of GL to connect it to the
Kemeny-optimal ranking KL of Eq. (7).
Theorem 2 Consider a profile L = (XA, f, u) ∈ L and its L-dominance graph GL =(A, EL). Let G′ = (A′, E ′) denote a strongly connected component of GL and define the
profile LA′ = (XA′ , f, u), where XA′ is the restriction of XA to alternatives in A′. We
have the following holding (here KLA′ is the restriction of K
L to alternatives in A′):
KLA′ =
in (A′,A\A′)
|A′| · e+K
LA′ , (11)
where e is a matrix of ones of appropriate dimension.
Proof. See Appendix.
Example 1. Theorem 2 is best illustrated with an example. Consider a profile L with
six alternatives leading to the following election matrix:
Y L =

0 −2 −3.5 .3 1 .7
2 0 −1 1 −1.2 .6
3.5 1 0 2 3 1.5
−.3 −1 −2 0 −4 0
−1 1.2 −3 4 0 1.5
−.7 −1 −1.5 0 −1.5 0

The L-dominance graph corresponding to election matrix Y L is seen in Figure 1. It
has the following three strongly connected components:
G1 = ({a3}, ∅) , G2 = ({a1, a2, a5}, {(a1, a5), (a5, a2), (a2, a1)}) , G3 = ({a4, a6}, {(a4, a6), (a6, a4)}) ,
implying the respective (sub)profiles LA1 , LA2 , LA3 . It is immediate to see that, among
voters in E(f), alternative a3 enjoys a net majority over all other alternatives. Further-
more, alternatives in A2 form a Condorcet cycle, since a net majority of voters in E(f)
prefer a1 to a5, a5 to a2, and a2 to a1. Moreover, these alternatives are all preferred
by a majority of voters in E(f) to those in A3. Conversely, alternatives in A3 receive
exactly equal support from voters in E(f), and lose all pairwise contests against all other
alternatives.
Applying Theorem 2 we see that, in any Kemeny-optimal ranking, a3 will be first,
while the ranks of (a1, a2, a5) will range between 2 and 4, and those of (a4, a6) between 5
and 6. By inspection, it is easy to optimally resolve the Condorcet cycle of graph G2 and
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Figure 1: L-dominance graph of Example 1. Strongly connected components in dashed ovals.
determine the precise Kemeny-optimal ranks of a1, a2 and a5: K
LA2 (a5) = 1, K
LA2 (a2) =
2, KLA2 (a1) = 3. Indeed, we obtain:
KLa3 = [0] + [1] = [1],
KLa1,a2,a5 =

1
1
1
+

3
2
1
 =

4
3
2
 ,
KLa4,a6 =
 4 4
4 4
+
 1 2
2 1
 =
 5 6
6 5
 .
Putting KLa3 , K
L
a1,a2,a5
and KLa4,a6 together we obtain the two Kemeny-optimal rankings
of profile L:
KL =

4 4
3 3
1 1
5 6
2 2
6 5

.
Computational implementation. The strongly connected components of the graph GL
can be efficiently identified with Tarjan’s algorithm [37]. Thus, Theorem 2 suggests that
problem (7) may be efficiently reduced to a series of smaller sub-problems, corresponding
to the strongly connected components of graph GL.
The question now becomes: how do we deal with an individual strongly connected
component G′ = (A′, E ′)? If |A′| is small enough (for a regular PC running Matlab this
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means less than or equal to 10), then KL
′
can be determined via brute-force enumeration
within a few minutes. Otherwise, for practicality, it is preferable to resort to polynomial-
time approximation algorithms.8 Here, we distinguish between two cases. If the profile
L′ satisfies restriction (8), then, the problem is one of full rank aggregation, and we may
employ a 4/3-approximation algorithm due to Van Zuylen and Williamson (VZW) [44]
(see Corollary 5.3 and DerandFASLP-Pivot in Figure 1 of [44]). This provides the best
approximation guarantee (of 4/3) currently available. Conversely, if the profile L′ does
not satisfy restriction (8), then the problem is one of partial rank aggregation, and we
employ the combinatorial algorithm of VZW outlined in Theorem 2.3 of [44], which in
turn builds on a randomized algorithm of Ailon [1]. This has an approximation guarantee
of 8/5.
The above observations are summarized in the following algorithm:
Algorithm 1. Input: L = (XA, f, u), M
1. Compute the election matrix Y L.
2. Construct graph GL.
3. Run Tarjan’s algorithm on GL.
4. For every strongly connected component G′ = (A′, E ′) of GL:
4a. If |A′| ≤M , determine KLA′ via enumeration.
4b. If |A′| > M and L′ ∈ L˜, approximate KLA′ by Corollary 5.3 in VZW [44].
4c. If |A′| > M and L′ 6∈ L˜, approximate KLA′ by Theorem 2.3 in VZW [44].
5. Apply Eq. (11) to all strongly connected components of GL. Where applicable,
approximate KLA′ with the VZW algorithm output.
Step 1 will usually need to be tackled numerically, via Monte Carlo methods, though
some profile spaces may admit analytic solutions (see Section 5). When a strongly con-
nected component of GL is large (e.g., having more than 20-25 vertices) and step 4b
is applicable, then, to speed up the running time of the relevant VZW approximation
algorithm, it is advisable to use a specialized LP-solver to quickly solve the linear pro-
gramming relaxation of the problem, as the latter is a subroutine of the main algorithm.
Conversely, the VZW algorithm for step 4c is a combinatorial algorithm that does not
8Clearly, the determination of what are considered “big” and “small” values for |A′| will depend on computing
power and memory.
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require linear programming. Finally, in cases where approximation algorithms are em-
ployed, the output ranking(s) of Algorithm 1 can be potentially improved by applying to
them a local search heuristic known as “local Kemenization” (Dwork et al. [15]).
5 A Special Case of the Model
5.1 Generalized weighted means
A family of welfare functions that is particularly popular in many policy contexts are
known as generalized weighted means [3, 29, 12, 16]. Parameterized by γ ∈ <, they are
denoted by uγ and satisfy
uγ(x,w) =

(∑I
i=1 wix
γ
i
) 1
γ
γ 6= 0,∏I
i=1 x
wi
i γ = 0.
(12)
When γ = 1 we recover the weighted arithmetic mean, whereas γ = 0 or γ = −1 imply
a weighted geometric and harmonic mean, respectively. As γ → +∞(−∞), uγ(x,w)
converges to the maximum (minimum) coordinate of x.
I note a simple corollary of the definition of Proposition 1.
Corollary 1 The family of generalized weighted means (12) belongs to the class U∗ dis-
cussed in Proposition 1.
As a result, we do not need to account for partial input rankings.
5.2 Weight imprecision via -contamination
Assume we are given an initial vector of weights w¯ ∈ ∆I−1, representing a preliminary
and tentative choice of weighting scheme. Now, suppose that we are willing to grant
equal consideration to weights deviating from w¯ belonging in the set W w¯, where
9
W w¯ ≡ W  = (1− )w¯ + ∆I−1 =
{
w ∈ <I : w ≥ (1− )w¯,
I∑
i=1
wi = 1
}
. (13)
Here, the parameter  ∈ [0, 1] measures the imprecision associated with the initial
vector of weights w¯. If  = 0, then we are completely confident in our choice of w¯, while
if  = 1 we assign no special status to w¯ and consider all possible weight vectors equally
valid. Originally developed in Bayesian analysis, this way of parameterizing probabilistic
imprecision is known as -contamination (the interested reader may consult Berger and
9In what follows I will suppress dependence of the results on w¯ to avoid very cumbersome notation.
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Berliner [8] for additional information). The -contamination parametric structure has
been studied in the decision-theoretic literature on Knightian uncertainty ([27, 22], among
many others), which however places more emphasis on the normative foundations and
behavioral implications of such belief imprecision. Application areas have included job
search [26] and optimal investment [28].
First introduced by Foster et al. [16] in the context of composite indices of welfare,
this way of parameterizing imprecision over w is equivalent to the following importance
function f :
f (w) =
 1V ol(W ) w ∈ W ,0 otherwise, (14)
where V ol denotes volume in <I−1.
For a pair of alternatives (ai, aj) ∈ A×A the set W uγaiaj is equal to
W u
γ
aiaj
=
{
w ∈ ∆I−1 : uγ(xai ,w) ≥ uγ(xaj ,w)
}
.
Now, we introduce the difference vector dγaiaj , abbreviated for simplicity by d
γ, where,
for all k = 1, 2, ..., I:
dγk =

xγaik − xγajk , if γ > 0,
xγajk − xγaik , if γ < 0,
log (xaik)− log
(
xajk
)
, if γ = 0.
(15)
It is straightforward to see that the setW u
γ
aiaj
can be simplified into the following polytope10
W u
γ
aiaj
=
{
w ∈ ∆I−1 : (dγ)′w ≥ 0} . (16)
Subsequently, define the set W ,γaiaj as the intersection of W
 and W u
γ
aiaj
, so that
W ,γaiaj =
{
w ∈ <I : w ≥ (1− )w¯,
I∑
i=1
wi = 1, (d
γ)′w ≥ 0
}
. (17)
Then, applying Eqs. (3)-(4) to profiles satisfying L = (XA, uγ, f ) for a choice of  ∈ (0, 1]
and γ ∈ <, we may write:
V Lij ≡ V ,γij =
V ol
(
W ,γaiaj
)
V ol(W )
, (18)
Y Lij ≡ Y ,γij = V ,γij − V ,γji . (19)
10This follows by the following equivalence
uγ(xai ,w) ≥ uγ(xaj ,w) ⇔

∑I
i=1 wix
γ
aii
≥∑Ii=1 wixγaji, if γ > 0,∑I
i=1 wix
γ
aii
≤∑Ii=1 wixγaji if γ < 0,∑I
i=1 wi log
(
xaji
) ≥∑Ii=1 wi log (xaji) if γ = 0.
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We focus on the more intuitive quantity of V ,γij . By Corollary 1 we know that, unless
xai = xaj , V
,γ
ij + V
,γ
ji = 1. Now, basic geometric reasoning allows us to establish an
unambiguous monotonicity property of V ,γij with respect to the level of imprecision .
Theorem 3 Consider a pair of alternatives (ai, aj) and their difference vector d
γ of
Eq. (15).
(i) Suppose (dγ)′ w¯ 6= 0. Then, V ,γij is monotonic in  ∈ (0, 1]. It is weakly increasing
(decreasing) in  if
(dγ)′w¯ < (>)0.
(ii) Suppose (dγ)′ w¯ = 0. Then, V ,γij is constant in  ∈ (0, 1].
Proof. See Appendix.
Thus, when (dγ)′ w¯ 6= 0, and ai and aj do not yield identical welfare under the initial
vector of weights w¯, Theorem 3 establishes that the proportion of weights favoring one
alternative over another varies monotonically in the imprecision  attached to w¯. The
direction of the relationship depends on the comparison of alternatives ai and aj under
initial weights w¯. It is decreasing if ai initially dominates aj and increasing otherwise.
Conversely, when the initial weights yield identical composite scores for ai and aj, then
V ,γij remains constant as we vary .
The next step is to find a simple way to calculate the ratios V ,γij . To this end, I need
to first express polytope W ,γaiaj as a system of linear inequalities. Define the function
D,γ = −1− 

(dγ)′ w¯, (20)
and suppose that there exists at least one indicator i∗ ∈ I such that dγi∗ ≥ D,γ. If
such an i∗ does not exist, then we may immediately conclude that V ,γij = 0 (see proof of
Theorem 3). Define w∗ ∈ <I−1 and dγ∗ ∈ <I−1 as the restriction of vectors w and dγ
to indicators in I\{i∗} ≡ I∗. Consider the following polytope W ,γ∗aiaj (here e denotes a
vector of all ones of dimension I − 1)
W ,γ∗aiaj =
{
w∗ ∈ <I−1 : w∗ ≥ 0,
∑
i∈I∗
w∗i ≤ 1, (dγ,∗ − dγi∗e)′w∗ + dγi∗ ≥ D,γ
}
. (21)
Polytope W ,γ∗aiaj is obtained upon performing a sequence of simple affine transforma-
tions to polytope W ,γaiaj (see the proof of Theorems 3 and 4). Using basic results from
linear algebra (Lang [23]) I arrive at the following Theorem.
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Theorem 4 Let i∗ ∈ I such that dγi∗ ≥ D,γ, and consider polytope W ,γ,∗aiaj given by (21).
V ,γij defined in Eq. (18) satisfies
V ,γij = (I − 1)! V ol
(
W ,γ∗aiaj
)
Proof. See Appendix.
In light of Theorem 4, the main challenge now lies in calculating the volume of
polytope W ,γ∗aiaj . To this end, I make the following assumption.
Assumption 1 There does not exist i ∈ I∗ such that dγ∗i = D,γ.
Assumption 1 ensures that polytope W ,γ∗aiaj is simple, i.e., that all of its vertices are
nondegenerate. Primal nondegeneracy is a desirable property in linear programming as
it facilitates the application of the simplex method (see Chapter 2 in Bertsimas and
Tsitsiklis [6]). This enables the direct use of Lawrence’s [24] formula for computing the
volume of a polytope.
Remark 1. Assumption 1 is not strictly necessary for the implications of the analysis
(i.e., the following Proposition 2) to hold. As Lawrence himself notes in his paper’s
conclusion [24], his method can be extended to non-simple polytopes using standard linear
programming techniques (see Bueler et al. [9] for further discussions and applications).
I choose to impose Assumption 1 because it can be always easily satisfied by a slight
perturbation of w¯ or , while simplifying computations.
Proposition 2 Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then polytope W ,γ∗aiaj is simple. Moreover
it has O (I2) vertices and O (I3) edges that can be readily identified (Eqs. (V1)-(V4) and
(E1)-(E8) in Appendix). Using this information we can construct a vector c ∈ <I−1
such that the function h(w∗) = c′w∗ is non-constant on each edge of W ,γ∗aiaj (Eq. (33) in
Appendix). As a result, the volume of polytope W ,γ∗aiaj can be computed efficiently using
the formula in Theorem 1 of Lawrence [24] (Eq. (34) in Appendix).
Proof. See Appendix.
Thus, by Proposition 2 we have an efficient method of computing V ,γij for any two
alternatives ai and aj, and choice  ∈ (0, 1] and γ ∈ <. Examples 2 and 3 illustrate the
two different cases of Theorem 3.
Example 2. One of the strengths of the proposed framework is that it sheds light on
subtle differences among alternatives. This is illustrated by the following example:
xai = (0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4)
′, xaj = (0.4, 0.3, 0.2, 0.15)
′, w¯ =
(
1
4
,
1
4
,
1
4
,
1
4
)′
, γ = 1.
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Looking at just the ordinal dimension of the indicator data, we see that both ai and aj
dominate in exactly two dimensions. Moreover, the difference in the composite scores
under zero imprecision is relatively small: 0.2500 for ai and 0.2625 for aj. This may lead
us to think that the two alternatives are roughly equal, and remain all the more so when
we take weight imprecision into account. However, this is not the case. Indeed, we see
that in reality aj fares significantly better than ai if we allow for weight imprecision (and
our model makes quantitatively precise to what degree this is so), especially if we only
wish to consider small levels of :
V 0.1,1ij = 0.090, V
0.25,1
ij = 0.312, V
0.5,1
ij = 0.408, V
1,1
ij = 0.458.
Example 3. I provide an example of the situation discussed in part (ii) of Theorem 3.
Consider:
xai = (0.1, 0.2, 0.35, 0.4, 0.5)
′, xaj = (0.35, 0.4, 0.5, 0.1, 0.2)
′, w¯ =
(
1
5
,
1
5
,
1
5
,
1
5
,
1
5
)′
, γ = 1.
Indeed, xaj is obtained by simply permuting the elements of xai . This instance yields
w¯′xai = w¯
′xaj , V
,1
ij = 0.478, ∀ ∈ (0, 1].
This example further suggests how the distribution of the achievement scores across indi-
cators can be very important in determining the dominance relation between alternatives.
How could  be set? I close Section 5 by offering a few thoughts on the calibration
of the parameter . From a general statistical standpoint,  may be interpreted as the
amount of error attached to the prior w¯ (Berger and Berliner [8]). In the context of
composite indices of welfare, the choice of  is largely subjective and should, in theory,
be set by the policy makers who will actually use the composite index. Nevertheless,
the simple structure of -contamination may inform this process by shedding light on the
implications of different choices. First, it is clear that restricting weights to lie in W 
places a lower bound of (1 − ) on all ratios wi
w¯i
, implying the following upper and lower
bounds on wi:
wi
w¯i
≥ 1− , ∀i ∈ I,
⇔ wi ∈
[
w¯i − w¯i, w¯i + (1− w¯i)
]
, ∀i ∈ I. (22)
Less obviously, a choice of  implies the following relationship between the volumes (in
(I − 1)-dimensional space) of W  and the standard (I − 1)-simplex ∆I−1:
V ol (W )
V ol (∆I−1)
= I−1. (23)
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Eq. (23) can be easily established and the relation it implies is independent of the vector
w¯ (see Eqs. (26)-(27) in the proof of Theorem 4). It could possibly serve as a guide for
policy makers who wish to “cover” a target percentage of all possible vectors of weights,
while respecting the bounds of Eq. (22).
6 Numerical Application
In this section, I apply Algorithm 1 to Shanghai University’s Academic Ranking of World
Universities (ARWU), a popular composite index measuring research excellence in aca-
demic institutions.11 The ARWU Index measures academic excellence through the fol-
lowing six criteria: (1) number of alumni winning Nobel prizes or Fields medals, (2)
number of faculty winning Nobel prizes or Fields medals; (3) highly-cited researchers in
21 broad categories; (4) papers published in Nature or Science; (5) papers indexed in
Science Citation Index-expanded and Social Science Citation Index; (6) per capita aca-
demic performance of an institution. Indicator 1 is meant to capture quality of education,
indicators 2 and 3 the quality of the faculty, 4 and 5 research output, and 6 academic
performance. For each indicator, the highest scoring institution is assigned a score of
100, and other institutions are calculated as a percentage of the top score.
University scores are computed via a simple linear average, that is u(x,w) =
∑6
i=1wixi.
Hence, the relevant welfare function is given by Eq. (12) with γ = 1, i.e., u1. The following
vector of weights is employed: w′ = (.1, .2, .2, .2, .2, .1), and university rankings are based
on these composite scores. Despite its increasing influence and popularity, the ARWU
index has been criticized on many grounds, including its non-robustness to changes in
weights (Saisana et al. [34]).
I proceed to apply the analysis of Section 5 and consider imprecision over the ARWU
index weights via the −contamination framework of Eq. (13) with w¯ equal to the vector
of weights used by the developers of the ARWU index. Focusing on the top-100 univer-
sities reported in the 2013 ARWU rankings, denoted by A100, I consider three values for
 that reflect plausible departures from the initial weights w¯, namely  ∈ {1/6, 1/3, 1/2}.
When  = 0 and there is no imprecision over weights, the (partial) ranking of the 100
first universities is denoted by K0. Unlike the designers of the ARWU index, I do not
round university scores to 1 decimal point. This means that K0 has fewer ties than the
partial ranking reported on the ARWU website.
I implement Algorithm 1 in Matlab with a choice of M = 10. Step 1 is performed
11See www.shanghairanking.com
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using the insights of Lawrence’s formula via Proposition 2.12 In the case of Step 3, I
use a Matlab implementation of Tarjan’s algorithm due to David F. Gleich of Stanford
University (Copyright).13 For Step 4b, I coded the Van Zuylen and Williamson algorithm
myself (Step 4c was not applicable, due to Corollary 1).
The second column of Table 1 shows the number of non-singleton strongly connected
components for the corresponding L-dominance graphs, while the third a vector indicating
the number of universities that each such strongly connected component includes. We see
that as  grows and we enlarge the set of weights W  under consideration, the Condorcet
paradox becomes more and more pronounced. As the size of the strongly connected
components is never greater than M = 10, Step 4a of Algorithm 1 was always applicable.
Thus, we can definitely conclude that Algorithm 1’s output are the Kemeny-optimal
rankings of the three problem instances.
 Number Sizes
1/6 1 5
1/3 3 (4,8,3)
1/2 6 (4,9,3,6,5,3)
Table 1: 2013 ARWU rankings: Number and sizes of non-singleton strongly connected compo-
nents for L-dominance graphs GL, where L = (XA100 , f , u1).
For convenience, denote by K the Kemeny-optimal ranking of universities in U100
when applying the method for different values of . Figure 2 shows the initial ARWU
scores for the top-100 universities, as well as their rankings under K0 and the Kemeny-
optimal rankings K for  ∈ {1/6, 1/3, 1/2}. Figure 3 depicts K0(a) − K(a) for all
a ∈ A100 and  ∈ {1/6, 1/3, 1/2}. We see that these differences grow as we increase ,
and are much more pronounced for universities in the 51-100 range. There are moreover
a handful of really substantial swings in rankings. For instance, the Ecole Normale
Superieure-Paris was ranked 71st in the official 2013 ARWU ranking, whereas its Kemeny-
optimal ranks for  = 1/6, 1/3, 1/2 are are 62, 54, and 49, respectively. This discrepancy
seems to be due to its extremely good performance in Indicator 6.
On a final note, to test the efficacy of the VZW approximation algorithm, I reran
Algorithm 1 using M = 3 and compared the output rankings to the known Kemeny-
optimal ones. The VZW rankings for  = 1/6 and 1/3 are completely unchanged. When
12For stability, where necessary I truncate the constant C in Eq. (33) to not exceed 10.
13This code can be found at http://www.mathworks.it/matlabcentral/fileexchange/24134-gaimc-graph-
algorithms-in-matlab-code/content/gaimc/scomponents.m
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 = 1/2, the only difference between the VZW and K1/2 rankings is that the University of
Western Australia (alternative a91) and Case Western University (alternative a99) switch
their Kemeny-optimal ranks of 91 and 92 respectively. Thus the VZW ranking is not
Kemeny-optimal, since V
1
2
,1
91,99 = .5087 and flipping the two ranks results in an improved
objective function value. (Note, however, that this error could have been corrected by
using the local Kemenization heuristic of Dwork et al. [15]).
7 Directions for Future Research
Judgments based on composite indices of welfare depend, sometimes critically, on how
different dimensions of performance are weighted. As there is frequently no single “right”
way to assign such weights, it is important to take this imprecision into account in a
systematic and transparent manner. In this paper I have drawn from the theory of social
choice to present a procedure for determining a ranking of the relevant alternatives that
is normatively compelling and statistically interpretable. Special attention to issues of
practicality and computational tractability has also been given. The applicability of the
proposed framework was illustrated through a numerical example based on Shanghai
University’s ARWU index.
This work suggests fruitful avenues for future research. An immediate one involves
investigating whether the characterization of Theorem 1 can be extended to the full
profile domain L. In particular, this would entail extending the results of Young and
Levenglick [43] to real-valued election matrices. Alternatively, one could introduce ran-
dom noise to achievement vectors and attempt to use the statistical interpretation of
Kemeny’s rule as a maximum likelihood estimate [41] to derive significance tests along
the lines of Duclos et al. [13]. Finally, one could also undertake more complex empirical
applications of the model, like for instance those corresponding to discontinuous welfare
functions that are often found in poverty indices (e.g. [13, 2]).
Broader connections with decision-theoretic models of Knightian uncertainty could
also be explored. This is because, as mentioned in the introduction, the examination of
welfare indices under weight imprecision is, mathematically if not conceptually, analogous
to certain settings of decision-making under ambiguity (see Gilboa and Marinacci [18]).14
Perhaps the work presented here, with its connections to classical voting theory, could
be of relevance to this vibrant field of economic theory.
14The conceptual difference is that in the former we have uncertain weight vectors over dimensions of well-being,
while in the latter uncertain Bayesian priors over states of nature.
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Appendix
A1: Proofs
Proposition 1. Consider case (a) first. Since g is invertible,
WXA,uaiaj ∩WXA,uajai =
{
w ∈ ∆I−1 :
I∑
i=1
wiui(xaii) =
I∑
i=1
wiui(xaji)
}
.
As the functions ui are strictly monotone, unless xai = xaj the above set will be a
polytope of dimension I − 2. Thus, WXA,uaiaj ∩WXA,uajai will have zero Lebesgue measure in
∆I−1. The result follows.
Case (b) is exactly similar, with the only difference that the intersection of WXA,uaiaj
and WXA,uajai reduces to:
WXA,uaiaj ∩WXA,uajai =
{
w ∈ ∆I−1 :
I∑
i=1
wi log (ui(xaii)) =
I∑
i=1
wi log
(
ui(xaji)
)}
.
Theorem 1. (i) By Eqs. (4) and (7), it is clear that K satisfies all six properties.
(ii) First, we prove the following lemma that will be needed later on.
Lemma 1 For all subsets L′ of L˜, define the set YL′ = {Y L : L ∈ L′}. Recall restric-
tion (8) and let L˜Q = {L ∈ L˜ : Y L ∈ YQ}. We have Y L˜Q = YQ = YLQ .
Proof. First of all, it is clear by the definition of Eq. (3) that
Y L˜Q ⊂ YQ.
Now, consider the welfare function u∗(x,w) =
∑I
i=1 wixi. Moreover, consider the achieve-
ment matrix X∗A = IA where IA is the A× A identity matrix.
For each R ∈ RA, define the set W ∗R = {w ∈ ∆I−1 : RX
∗
A,u
∗
w = R}. Letting aˆR(i) =
{a ∈ A : R(a) = i}, it is easy to see that W ∗R = {w ∈ ∆I−1 : waˆR(1) > waˆR(2) > ... >
waˆR(A)}.
The sets W ∗R are symmetric in ∆
I−1 and mutually exclusive. Moreover, u∗ satisfies the
assumption of Proposition 1. Indeed, we have∫
W ∗R
dw =
∫
∆I−1
1
{
R
X∗A,u
∗
w = R
}
dw =
1
A!
, ∀R ∈ RA. (24)
Now, writing RA = {R1, R2, ..., RA!}, consider the family of importance functions F∗,
where (QI+ is the set of non-negative rational I-dimensional vectors)
F∗ =
{
f : ∆I−1 7→ <+ : f(w) = zi, ∀w ∈ W ∗Ri ,∀i = 1, 2, ..., A!, z ∈ QI+,
A!∑
i=1
zi > 0
}
.
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Define the set of profiles L∗ = {L ∈ L : XA = X∗A, f ∈ F∗, u = u∗}. By Eq. (24) and
the structure of the importance functions in F∗, we may conclude
YL∗ = YQ.
Thus, since L∗ ⊂ L˜Q, we have YQ ⊂ Y L˜Q implying YQ = Y L˜Q . That YQ = YLQ follows
from the fact that YLQ ⊂ YQ and YQ = Y L˜Q ⊂ YLQ .
Let us now consider a rule φ satisfying the stated properties and recall the constructed
electorate E(f) with its associated partial input rankings and election matrices. If there
are just two alternatives, then φ must be simple majority rule and hence equal to K
(Young [40], footnote 18 in Young [41]). Note that partial input rankings do not create
any problems for this result to go through (see page 51 in Young [40]). When there are
more than two alternatives, LIIA together with the previous majority rule for all profiles
of two alternatives imply that the rule must satisfy the Condorcet property of Young
and Levenglick [43] (see footnote 18 in Young [41]). As a result, Lemma 1 in Young and
Levenglick [43] implies that for every L ∈ L, φ(L) depends only on the election matrix
Y L. Again, partial input rankings do not affect the proof of this result. Hence, the
characterization of K may be established on the domain Y L
Q
(instead of LQ), which, by
Lemma 1 above, is equal to YQ. The latter is the same domain on which Young and
Levenglick [43] prove their characterization of Kemeny’s rule (see their Lemma 1 on page
292 and the discussion immediately preceding and following it). Hence, φ = K follows
from Young and Levenglick [43] and the argument delineated in footnote 18 of Young [41].
Theorem 2. Recall that L = (XA, f, u). Suppose graph GL has M strongly connected
components denoted by G1 = (A1, E1), G2 = (Aj, E2), , ..., GM = (AM , EM).
For each m = 1, 2, ...,M define gm ≡ in(Am,A\Am)|Am| . Now for all pairs (Gi, Gj) either all
vertices in Gi are pointing to all vertices in Gj, or vice versa. For, if this were not true, it
would be possible to form a cycle that included vertices in both Gi and Gj contradicting
the fact that they are separate strongly connected components. If all vertices in Gi are
pointing to all vertices in Gj, then they are also pointing to all of the vertices Gj is
pointing to (if not there would exist a cycle), implying gi < gj. Conversely, if all vertices
in Gj are pointing to all vertices in Gi then gi > gj. Thus, we may deduce that gi < gj
if and only if all vertices in Gi are pointing to all vertices in Gj.
The above implies that it is possible to order the gi’s in strictly ascending order and
we may assume, without loss of generality, that g1 < g2 < .... < gM . With this ordering
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in mind, define the sets A−m = A1 ∪ A2 ∪ ... ∪ Am and A+m = Am ∪ Am+1 ∪ ... ∪ AM , for
all m = 1, 2, ...,M .
We proceed by proving that KL must be such that, for all m = 1, 2, ...M − 1, all
alternatives in A−m are ranked before all alternatives in A+m+1. To wit, consider the
alternatives in A−m. Since gi < gj for all (i, j) such that i ≤ m and j > m, we know that
all alternatives in A−m are pointing to all alternatives in A+m+1. Hence Y Lij > 0 for all pairs
(ai, aj) ∈ A−m × A+m+1. Thus, since K satisfies the extended-Condorcet property, any
Kemeny-optimal ranking will have to rank all alternatives in A−m before all alternatives
in A+m+1.
Now, note that by the definition of GL we have |A−m| = in(Am+1,A\Am+1)|Am+1| . Thus, we
obtain the following relation for all R ∈ KL:
R(a) ∈
{
in(Am,A\Am)
|Am| + 1,
in(Am,A\Am)
|Am| + |Am|
}
, ∀a ∈ Am, m = 1, 2, ...,M. (25)
To determine the precise rank of the alternatives in each Am within the ranges given by
Eq.(25), it is sufficient, by LIIA, to solve for KLAm , and update accordingly.
Theorem 3. Let us first concentrate on the denominator of (18). We perform the
following two operations on the elements of W : (a) we translate them by −(1 − )w¯,
and then (b) multiply them by 1/. The resulting polytope is ∆I−1, the standard (I−1)-
simplex. The volume of the standard simplex ∆I−1 (which has a side length of
√
2) is
given by
V ol
(
∆I−1
)
=
√
2
I−1√
I
(I − 1)!
√
2I−1
=
√
I
(I − 1)! (26)
Basic linear algebra (see Lang [23]) implies that
V ol(W ) =
√
2(I−1)V ol
(
∆I−1
)
= I−1
√
I
(I − 1)! . (27)
Now let us focus on the numerator. Recall the difference vector dγ and the constant
D,γ = −1−

(dγ)′w¯, defined in Eq. (20). Performing the same affine transformation as
before, namely w ← w−(1−)w¯

, the polytope W ,γaiaj is transformed into
Ŵ ,γaiaj =
{
ŵ ∈ ∆I−1 : (dγ)′ŵ ≥ D,γ} , (28)
which in turn implies
V ol
(
W ,γaiaj
)
= I−1V ol
(
Ŵ ,γaiaj
)
. (29)
Putting Eqs. (27) and (29) together, we obtain
V ,γij =
V ol
(
W ,γaiaj
)
V ol (W )
=
(I − 1)!√
I
V ol
(
Ŵ ,γaiaj
)
. (30)
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Eqs (20) and (28) imply that the volume of Ŵ ,γaiaj is increasing in  if (d
γ)′w¯ < 0,
decreasing if (dγ)′w¯ = 0, and constant if (dγ)′w¯ = 0. The result now follows from
Eq. (30).
Theorem 4. Assume without loss of generality that i∗ = I. Consider the polytope
W ,γ,∗aiaj of Eq. (21), obtained by using the equality constraint
∑I
i=1 w1 = 1 to eliminate
variable I from polytope Ŵ ,γ:
W ,γ,∗aiaj =
{
w∗ ∈ <I−1 : w∗ ≥ 0,
∑
i∈I∗
w∗i ≤ 1, (d∗ − dγi∗e)′w∗ + dγi∗ ≥ D,γ
}
.
The affine transformation h which maps polytope W ,γ,∗aiaj to Ŵ
,γ
aiaj
is given by h : <I−1 →
<I , satisfying h(w∗) = T ·w∗ + [0, 0, ..., 0, 1]′, where T is an I × (I − 1) matrix equal to:
T =

1 0 0 · · · 0
0 1 0 · · · 0
...
. . .
0 0 · · · 1
−1 −1 −1 · · · −1

⇒ T ′ · T =

2 1 1 · · · 1
1 2 1 · · · 1
...
. . .
1 1 · · · 2 1
1 1 1 · · · 2

Thus we have det [T ′ · T ] = I. Once again, basic linear algebra [23] implies that
V ol
(
Ŵ ,γaiaj
)
=
√
det [T ′ · T ] · V ol
(
W ,γ,∗aiaj
)
=
√
I · V ol
(
W ,γ,∗aiaj
)
. (31)
Eqs. (30)-(31) together imply
V ,γaiaj = (I − 1)! V ol
(
W ,γ,∗aiaj
)
.
Proposition 2. We first identify the vertices of polytope W ,γ∗aiaj . In doing so, we divide
the set of indicators I∗ = {1, 2, ..., I − 1} into I∗1 and I∗2 , such that
I∗1 = {i ∈ I∗ : dγ∗i > D,γ} , I∗2 = {i ∈ I∗ : dγ∗i < D,γ} .
Assumption 1 ensures that {I∗1 , I∗2} is a partition of I∗, and we let I∗1 = |I∗1 | and I∗2 = |I∗2 |
. It will be useful to express polytope W ,γ∗aiaj in the following way:
W ,γ,∗aiaj = {w∗ ∈ <I−1 : y′kw∗ ≤ b}, (32)
where the (I − 1)-dimensional vectors yk, k = 1, 2, ..., I + 1, and b satisfy (a) yk = −ek15
and bk = 0 for k = 1, ..., I − 1, (b) yI = [1, 1, 1, ..., 1]′ and bI = 1, and (c) yI+1 =
−dγ∗ + dγi∗e and bI+1 = −D,γ + dγi∗ .
15Here ek denotes the corresponding standard basis vector in <I−1.
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With representation (32) in mind, a vector v is a vertex of W ,γ∗aiaj if it satisfies I − 1
linearly independent inequality constraints with equality [6]. The structure of vectors yk
for k = 1, 2, ..., I + 1 and b imply that a vertex of W ,γ∗aiaj can have at most 2 nonzero
entries. Furthermore, Assumption 1 ensures primal nondegeneracy so that every vertex
v will correspond to a unique basis matrix Bv, i.e., a unique set of linearly independent
constraints satisfied with equality.
We may distinguish between four kinds of vertices and their corresponding bases:
(V1) v0 = 0. B0 = {y′k : k = 1, 2, .., I − 1}
(V2) vi = ei for all i ∈ I∗1 . Here Bi = {y′k : k = 1, ..., i − 1, i + 1, .., I − 1, I}, for all
i ∈ I∗1 .
(V3) vj = pijej, where pij =
dγ
i∗−D,γ
dγ
i∗−d
γ∗
j
, for all j ∈ I∗2 . Here Bj = {y′k : k = 1, ..., j − 1, j +
1, .., I − 1, I + 1}, for all j ∈ I∗2 .
(V4) vij = piijei + (1 − piij)ej, where piij = D
,γ−dγ∗j
dγ∗i −dγ∗j
, for all i ∈ I∗1 and j ∈ I∗2 . Here
Bij = {y′k : k = 1, ..., i− 1, i+ 1, .., j− 1, j+ 1, ..., I, I+ 1}, for all i ∈ I∗1 and j ∈ I∗2 .
Two vertices are connected by an edge if they share I − 2 common linearly independent
active constraints [6]. An examination of the preceding expressions for the vertices of
W ,γ,∗aiaj and their bases, implies that we may identify the following eight kinds of undirected
edges:
(E1) (v0,vi), for all i ∈ I∗1 .
(E2) (v0,vj), for all j ∈ I∗2 .
(E3) (vi,vk) for all pairs (i, k) where i, k ∈ I∗1 .
(E4) (vj ,vk) for all pairs (j, k) where j, k ∈ I∗2 .
(E5) (vi,vij) for all pairs (i, j) where i ∈ I∗1 and j ∈ I∗2 .
(E6) (vj ,vij) for all pairs (i, j) where i ∈ I∗1 and j ∈ I∗2 .
(E7) (vij ,vik) for all triplets (i, j, k) where i ∈ I∗1 and j, k ∈ I∗2 .
(E8) (vij ,vkj) for all triplets (i, j, k) where i, k ∈ I∗1 and j ∈ I∗2 .
Recall that we wish to exhibit a vector c ∈ <I−1 such that the function h(w∗) = c′w∗ is
non-constant on each edge of W ,γ∗aiaj . To this end, recall the vertices of W
,γ∗
aiaj
enumerated
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above as (V1)-(V4) and the values of pij for j ∈ I∗2 and piij for all i ∈ I∗1 and j ∈ I∗2 .
Define the following two quantities
δi = min
i∈I∗1 , j,k∈I∗2
{|piij − piik| : piij 6= piik}. If undefined, set δi = 1.
δj = min
i,k∈I∗1 , j∈I∗2
{|piij − pikj| : piij 6= pikj}. If undefined, set δj = 1.
Consequently let δ = min{δi, δj} and define C = 2δ .
Finally, relabel the elements of set I∗2 = {j1, j2, ..., jI∗2} so that pij1 ≤ pij2 ≤ ... ≤ pijI∗2 .
Now, define the vector c satisfying
cl =
 C + k(I∗1+1) , if l = ik ∈ I∗1 ,k
I∗2 (I
∗
1+1)
, if l = jk ∈ I∗2 .
(33)
With this choice of c we can check all eight kinds of edges (E1)-(E8) and verify that
c′v 6= c′u for all pairs of adjacent vertices (v,u). Thus the function f(w∗) = c′w∗ is
non-constant on each edge of W ,γ∗aiaj . Hence, in conjunction with Assumption 1, we may
apply Theorem 1 in Lawrence [24] to conclude
V ol
(
W ,γ,∗aiaj
)
=
∑
vertices v
of W ,γ∗aiaj
(c′v)I−1
(I − 1)! |det (Bv)|
I−1∏
i=1
[
(B′v)
−1
c
]
i
. (34)
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Figure 2: 2013 ARWU Top-100: Initial scores and ranking K0, and Kemeny-optimal rankings
K for  ∈ {1/6, 1/3, 1/2}.
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Figure 3: 2013 ARWU Top-100: K0 −K.
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